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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5 November 1952

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 283

SUBJECT: Estimative Program through 1953--from the General Group

I. ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND WORK IN PROGRESS

1. On 5 May 1952 the Board notified the IAC of its estimative program for the remainder of 1952. The Board stated that the formulation of its program had been guided by the following principles:

- a. Communist intentions and capabilities could best be examined on a global basis.
- b. Non-Communist capabilities and vulnerabilities could best be examined on a regional basis.
- c. Other estimates relating to particular countries and situations would be required in response to authorized requests or specific current developments.
- d. A periodic review of the world situation was required.

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2. The Board advised the IAC that the following estimates would be recommended at an appropriate time during 1952 to supplement the program of estimates already under way:

- a. Probable Soviet Strategy through 1957.
- b. Prospects for the Development of Strength and Stability in Western Europe.
- c. Future Orientation of West Germany.
- d. Italy's Prospective Role in the Western Security System.
- e. Prospects for the Development of Strength and Stability in the Middle East.
- f. Problems in Latin America Affecting US Security.
- g. Problems and Probable Developments in South Africa.
- h. Problems and Probable Developments in Central and West Africa.

3. Items a, b, c, and h have not been initiated. The status of the other four projects is as follows:

- d. Italy (NIE-71). Contributions received 29 September. Staff drafting.

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- e. Middle East (NIE-73). Contributions received 9 September. Staff drafting.
- f. Latin America (NIE-70). Draft before IAC representatives.
- g. South Africa (NIE-72). Completed.

4. The following estimates were already under way in May of this year:

a. On the Soviet side.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Short Title</u>	<u>Present Status</u>
NIE-64 (I)	Bloc Capabilities	Completed
NIE-64 (II)	Bloc Intentions	Before IAC Reps
NIE-65	Bloc Potential	Awaiting contributions
NIE-40	Value of Western Europe to Bloc	Before Board
NIE-47	Bloc in Asia	Completed
NIE-58	Sino-Soviet	Completed
SIE-5	Air Defense	Before IAC Reps
SE-27	Vulnerability of China	Completed
NIE-59	East-West Trade	Staff drafting

Outside the Soviet bloc.

NIE-63	France	Staff drafting
SE-32	Loss of India	Completed
NIE-52	Japan	Completed
NIE-69	North Africa	Completed
NIE-66	Argentina	Completed
NIE-67	Venezuela	Completed
NIE-56	Far East Resources	Before Board

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5. The following additional estimates have been laid on since May as a result of authorized requests or specific developments:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Short Title</u>	<u>Present Status</u>
NIE-55/1	Korea	Completed
SE-30	Berlin	Completed
NIE-35/2	Indochina	Completed
SE-28	Oil Report	Completed
SE-29	Chinese Nationalists	Completed
SE-31	Denmark	Completed
NIE-42/1	Albania	Completed
NIE-45	Free World Attitudes	Postponed
NIE-74	Burma	Awaiting contributions
NIE-75	Iran	Before IAC Reps

6. In addition to its estimative program, the Board has completed special memoranda and special projects on a variety of subjects.

II. COMMENT ON ADEQUACY OF PROGRAM

7. The principles guiding the formulation of our estimative program still appear sound. The NSC has continued to approach the Communist problem on a global basis, free world vulnerability problems on a regional basis, and other critical problems on a country basis. The need for an over-all estimate of the world situation has been shown in the re-examination of the NSC 68 and 114 series and in the preparation of [REDACTED]

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8. Problems have arisen in execution of the program: a backlog of unfinished estimates, delays in making deadlines, and the pressure of other business. Other problems, such as lack of clarity with regard to the statements of the problem, the purpose of the estimates, and proper time span of the estimates, have caused difficulties. A special analysis of these problems and an attempt to identify their origin will be made separately.

9. In adopting its estimative program last May, the Board anticipated that the program would not cover all possible situations on which estimates would be required. This proved to be the case; new special estimates and revisions of existing estimates have been prepared, in each instance on a high priority and taking precedence over the broader estimative program.

10. The Board also expressed the hope that at some later date it would be possible to undertake a broad study of the long-range capabilities and vulnerabilities of the free world and of the Soviet bloc and to examine their relative prospects in the event of a prolonged period of political warfare. This still seems a sound hope; progress has been made which should make it realizable, and it should remain a goal of the program.

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III. THE NEW ESTIMATIVE PROGRAM

11. The attached estimative program has been prepared in accordance with the general principles adopted by the Board last May. In its formulation the program contains some novel elements:

a. Proposed estimates are divided into three categories:

(1) new subjects of the highest importance (including some uncompleted sections of the present program), (2) subjects previously estimated but requiring re-examination on a high priority, and (3) subjects upon which estimates are deemed desirable, but should be initiated only as events require or as workloads permit.

b. A section has been included covering research projects looking toward the initiation of specific estimates at a later date. This has been done in part to avoid carrying as formal estimates in process certain subjects which will require time-consuming research; in part to advise the research agencies of the general areas of study in which we are interested rather than to impose specific problems upon them with tight deadlines; in part

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to avoid the embarrassment of formally initiating estimates and then finding that the available information is insufficient to permit a satisfactory estimate.

12. The attached program is not designed to indicate more than the general nature of projects deemed necessary during the year 1953; the explanatory notes are not statements of the problems. In most instances also, no suggested time span of the estimate is indicated. We believe that, wherever possible, estimates should be long-range and not restricted by artificial terminal dates. Where we have included terminal dates, we have done so because the estimates have been proposed to meet definite planning periods.

13. Like the previous estimative program, this one covers a relatively few subjects, and is not expected to require more than 50 percent of the time of this office, even if all projects of secondary priority are completed. We have done this because we expect that the next year, like this one, will produce a variety of special requests and unanticipated developments requiring the attention of the office, and for which ample time should be left free.

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14. In addition to the estimative program itself, the Board may wish to consider preparing papers on some aspects of intelligence doctrine. In particular, it may wish to issue some kind of glossary of terminology including elucidation of such terms as "capabilities," "intentions," "probably," etc. It may wish to define the field of "national intelligence" in connection with such problems as net capabilities.

15. The Board may also wish to explore the possibilities of more direct relations with other policy agencies than the NSC Senior Staff, namely, the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and the Joint Planners in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The General Group feels that a formal review both of our intelligence doctrine and our relations with the policy-makers would facilitate our work and render the product more effective.

ATTACHMENT: Draft Memorandum for the IAC

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